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2Mission Overview
• EO-1 originated as a technology validation mission and 
pathfinder next generation Landsat and other missions
• Launched November 21, 2000 on a one year mission from 
Vandenberg into a sun-synchronous circular low earth orbit at 
705km altitude one minute behind Landsat-7
• Required to collect 200 paired images with Landsat-7
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Details about the mission, instruments, science, 
applications, and technologies are contained on the EO-1 
mission website at https://eo1.gsfc.nasa.gov/
Mission Overview
• EO-1 was originated as a space technology validation mission to act as a pathfinder 
for next generation Landsat and other missions
• Phase 1 was designed to validate the original 13 technologies in a shortened 
timeframe
• Phase 2 was designed to provide a wide distribution of the key instrument data 
which extended to the end of the mission
• Phase 3 added various onboard and ground software to validate inter-sensor 
collaboration techniques and to provide a space validation testbed
• Phase 4 added various software technology to improve mission efficiency and 
demonstrate various aspects of virtualizing the user interface to EO-1
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Mission Overview
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Phase 1:  Accelerated Technology Validation Mission
Phase 2: Public Access
Phase 3: SensorWeb/Testbed 
Phase 4: Virtual Observatory and Rapid Disaster Response 
Science validation and science studies for Landsat and imaging spectroscopy communities 
Prepare data archives for future science studies 
L
a
u
n
c
h
 1
1
-2
1
-0
0
EO-1 Mission Overview and Status - Background
• EO-1 was launched November 21, 2000 as a 1-year Technology Validation mission 
into a sun-synchronous circular low earth orbit in formation one minute behind 
Landsat-7
• EO-1 completed the validation of all 13 baseline technologies on schedule; 
including, the Advanced Land Imager (ALI) precursor to the Landsat Operational 
Land Imager (OLI) and the Hyperion instrument precursor to the Hyperspectral 
Infrared Imager (HyspIRI) mission.
• EO-1 was extended for further on-orbit spacecraft technology validation and land 
imagery science data capture and distribution.
• EO-1 instruments are healthy.  The spacecraft has experienced a GPS issue, a 
recorder management limitation, and some battery cell shorts that are all being 
operationally mitigated.
• EO-1 exhausted its fuel for orbit maintenance in 2011, and as a result the orbit has 
been decaying in altitude and drifting in mean local time.   
• 2013 and 2015 Senior Review panels have concluded that by 2016 the orbit 
geometry will provide limited science value 
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Launch Start of extended mission End of Fuel PassivationExit constellation
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
      Development Extended Mission EOM
             Prime                   
           Mission
Mission Overview: Instruments
• Advanced Land Imager (ALI) – push-broom multi-spectral 
with 9 spectral bands (30m per pixel resolution) and one 
panchromatic band (10m resolution)
– Precursor to the Operational Land Imager on-board Landsat-8
• Hyperion hyper-spectral with over 200 spectral bands 
operating in the range from 400 – 2400 nm (10nm 
bandwidths for each of the over 200 bands)
– Precursor to the instrument planned for the HyspIRI mission 
• Linear Etalon Imaging Spectral Array (LEISA) Atmospheric 
Corrector
– Precursor to the instrument on-board the New Horizons 
mission
6
7Some stats
Time EO-1 in operations:
Nov 21, 2000 to March 30, 2017
= 5973 days
#orbits in operations = 87205
(that is orbit # that we turned off)
EO-1 mass at launch  570.5 kg
- TRMM  3524 kg
- Terra   4863 kg
#Hyperion and Ali images:
–over 92000 each 
# Archived documents est: 4000-5000
# pages archived est:  100000-200000
Still working on this!
#papers & conference presentations:
1805  (have index)
#people who worked on EO-1:  560
8More stats
Received many external technology
awards post launch related to
extension of EO-1 Operations
#Flight Operation Team Leads:  7
- Alicia Kost
- Joe Howard
- Robert Bode
- Seth Shulman
- Baran Sahin
- Russell Dehart
- Ben Holt
# years I have been on EO-1
as of June 2017:  20
9Decommission Overview
Top Level 2017 Decommissioning Schedule
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Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept
TASK XX days
Decommissioning & Action 
Item Closure Review
1 days
Engineering Tests 
74 days
EOMP Signed 1 days
Fuel Depletion Burns 21 days
Key Decision Point Phase F 
(KDP-F) Review
1 days
Disposal Readiness Rev 1 days
*Passivation (potential) 1 days
*Passivation (90 day) 1 days
Decommission Facilities 90 days
End of Mission Report 103 days
Document Archives to 
NARA & Code 400
103 days
10-Mar
Not  started
2-Feb
10-Mar
20-Mar
12-Jan
26-Apr
17-Jul
17-Aug
23-Jan
30-Mar
Competed
Portion to be
completed
*Dependencies:
1. Passivation on March 30 or as directed by HQ
2. Delivery of document archives to NARA depends on resolving 
issue of NARA capable of receiving electronic records.
**  delay possible to move items to NARA
17-Aug**
22-Mar
23-Feb
Potential additional test(s) 
may be requested
completed
EO-1 Engineering Tests
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Test Description Status
Pulse Plasma 
Thruster
Final tests of one of the original EO-1 
technologies to test if firing Teflon ablation 
PPT contaminates imaging ability of 
Hyperion instrument.
2 tests were 
successfully 
completed.
Min/Max Drag Test
Validate model which predicts  orbital 
displacement by increasing and decreasing 
the drag area and demonstrate operational 
implementation.
Conducted multiple 
tests.
Passivation Day Activities Schedule
12
8
:0
0
A
M
9
:0
0
A
M
1
0
:0
0
A
M
1
1
:0
0
A
M
1
2
:0
0
P
M
1
:0
0
A
M
2
:0
0
P
M
3
:0
0
P
M
4
:0
0
P
M
5
:0
0
P
M
6
:0
0
P
M
7
:0
0
P
M
*  The actual GN/TDRS pass times will be available 2-weeks prior to passivation date. 
RF Silence Verification
Pre-passivation 
networks and 
facilities check
Upload passivation 
sequences
Prepare Spacecraft to 
accept discharging of 
battery 
Execute passivation 
sequence and verify 
power negative
Verify power 
negative & RF 
transponder off
Spare pass
* 
 Check that critical personnel present
 Verify Pre-Passivation Checklist
 Check state of spacecraft
 Briefing
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EO-1 Reentry Profile
- An uncontrolled reentry is predicted to occur in approximately 2056
- requirement: reenter within 25 years of passivation, not compliant with predicted re-entry in 39 years, waiver 
approved
- Spacecraft Debris Casualty Area (DCA) is 4.04 m2
- Probability of human casualty from reentering debris of about 1 in 19,400
- Requirement 1 in 10,000 compliant
Component Survivability m2
Advanced Land Imager 
Instrument 2.14
Battery 0.92
Propulsion Tank 0.98
Total 4.04
End of Mission Requirements/Constraints
Reqm’t #
Compliant or 
N/A
Not 
Compliant
Incomplete Comments from EOMP by Section Number
4.3-1.a x DEBRIS RELEASE - No debris is released by the spacecraft bus or instruments during normal operations or disposal.
4.3-1.b x OBJECT-TIME PRODUCT - N/A
4.3-2 x GEO-SYNCHRONOUS EARTH ORBIT (GEO) LIFETIME - N/A
4.4-1 x
ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSION - The probability of explosion for EO-1 of less than 0.001 cannot be demonstrated 
quantitatively, but the intent of the requirement is met.
4.4-2 x
DEPLETION OF STORED ENERGY - Sections 4.2 and 6.6 list actions to be taken to passivate the spacecraft, 
however compliance of all components cannot be achieved due to the Power and Propulsion system designs.  Waiver 
granted.
4.4-3 x INTENTIONAL BREAKUP - N/A
4.4-4 x INTENTIONAL BREAKUP - N/A
4.5-1 x
LARGE OBJECT COLLISION - Section 5.2 assesses that the subject probability is less than the 0.001 requirement and 
thus is compliant based on the remaining number of years on orbit.
4.5-2 x
SMALL OBJECT COLLISION - Section 5.3 assesses that the subject probability is greater than the 0.01 
requirement. Waiver granted.
4.6-1(a) x 25 YEAR REENTRY – Re-entry 39 years after passivation.  Waiver request has been granted (OD-07-15).  
4.6-1(b) x ON-ORBIT STORAGE - N/A
4.6-1(c) x DIRECT RETRIEVAL - N/A
4.6-2 x DISPOSAL NEAR GEO - N/A
4.6-3 x DISPOSAL BETWEEN LOW EARTH ORBIT (LEO) AND GEO - N/A
4.6-4 x DISPOSAL RELIABILITY - Section 6.7 assesses the subject probability of success to be at least 0.90.
4.7-1 x
CASUALTY RISK - Section 7.2 assesses the reentry risk to be 1:19,400, which is compliant with the requirement of 
1:10,000.  
4.8-1 x TETHERED SYSTEM - N/A
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Archives and Documents
• USGS will maintain long-term archive of EO-1 Science and Housekeeping Data (data 
already archived at USGS)
• GSFC Flight Projects Library will maintain repository of technical and administrative 
records (Progressing as planned)
• National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) will maintain archive of 
historically-significant information (Issue transferring Records to NARA)
o EO-1 electronic records are being categorized and labeled according to the NASA Records 
Retention Schedules (NRRS 1441.1A)
o TRMM electronic records also followed NRRS, however were not accepted by NARA
- NARA rejected transfer request either due to over-simplification of record description submitted or 
due to a change in NARA requirements that is not accurately captured in NRRS.
- The GSFC Center Records Manager (Peggy Jenkins) is seeking a path to records acceptance by 
NARA, with support from the GSFC FPD Records Manager (Nancy Rosenbaum) 
o Awaiting resolution between NASA and NARA on acceptable descriptions for the large 
accessions of records before being able to proceed
• Spacecraft Operations Final Report (Progressing as planned)
o Details the spacecraft mission from a high-level operations status
o Includes references to other forms of operations reports to support future mission inquiries
o Includes Lessons Learned
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Budget and Schedule Impacts
• EO-1 is operated with a small team with a small budget
– 3 person Flight Ops Team with ~$2.8M per year budget including operations and science 
• Large anomalies were not planned for in the PPBE
• In 2016, EO-1 experienced multiple anomalies
– Battery Cell Anomaly (03/23/2016) – resulted in Safe Hold
– GPS Anomaly – Anomaly discovered during restart of GPS during Safe Hold 
recovery on 03/29/2016.  Onboard incorrect GPS week number issue.
o Significant effort by team to attempt recovery
o Investigated code changes to compensate
o Developed, tested and implemented manual process to manage spacecraft clock 
and uplink spacecraft ephemeris
– Battery Cell anomaly (07/22/2016) – resulted in Safe Hold
• Archive effort was larger than anticipated
• The above anomaly investigation and recovery efforts, plus the 
requirements for archiving the documentation exceeded available budget  
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Rehearsals
• Conducted 4 formal rehearsals
o Two Nominal passivations to verify that prime and backup personnel could 
support passivation
o Contingency passivation
o Dress rehearsal
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Turning EO-1 Off on March 30, 2017
Consequence to Passivate/Phase F Completion
Decomissioning Risk Matrix
ID Trend Approach Risk Title
A  A CA Risk after Fuel Depletion 
B  A On-board Anomaly
C  M Passivation Readiness
D  M
Delay of Passivation Execution 
(Budget impact - Realized)
E  M Staffing (end of contract)
F  M / A Schedule Risk
G  M Records Archive
1  Very Low 2  Low 3  Moderate 4  High 5  Very High
Likelihood 0.1%<PT<2% 2%<PT<15% 15%<PT<25% 25%<PT<50% PT < 50%
Consequence No impact to full 
Passivation at 
expected Dates & 
completion of all 
objectives
Minor impact to full 
Passivation & 
completion of all 
objectives
Moderate impact to full Passivation 
& completion of all objectives.
Minimum Passivation & completion 
of all objectives achievable with 
margin
Major impact to full 
Passivation & completion of all 
objectives.  Minimum 
Passivation & completion of all 
objectives achievable
Minimum 
Passivation & 
completion of all 
objectives is not 
achievable.
Criticality L×C Trend Approach
High  Decreasing (Improving) M - Mitigate
 Increasing (Worsening) W - Watch
Med
 Unchanged A - Accept
Low  New Since Last Period R - Research
19
A
B
C
F
E
D
G
Rank ID Risk Statement Approach Status
Conjunction Risk 
between now and 
passivation (1×5)
Expected Closure:
03/30/17
A If CARA identifies a probable conjunction prior to 
passivation
Then EO1 may not be able to perform an adequate 
Debris Avoidance Maneuver and possibly be hit 
hindering Passivation
Accept • Accept that EO-1 will not be able 
to execute a Risk Mitigation 
Maneuver
On-board Anomaly 
occurs before 
passivation (1×5)
Expected Closure:
03/30/17
B If  On-board Anomaly occurs within a component 
critical to passivation
Then full passivation may not be completed
Accept • All components necessary for 
passivation are fully functional as 
of this review
Passivation 
Readiness (1×3)
Expected Closure:
03/30/17
C If Passivation preparations are inadequate
Then passivation may not be successful
Mitigate • Passivation products including 
stored commands, procedures, 
and new pages have been base-
lined and tested against the 
simulator
• Passivation day script has been 
developed to include contingency 
SOPs and pre-passivation 
checklist with waive-off criteria
• Passivation rehearsals are were 
conducted to prepare team.  All 
personnel (prime and backup) 
required for passivation have been 
certified 
Decommissioning Risks (cont’d)
Y
Y
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G
Rank ID Risk Statement Approach Status
Delay of Passivation 
Execution
(5×1)
Expected Closure:
01/27/17
D If passivation execution is delayed beyond February 
23, 2017
Then EO-1 budget will be insufficient to support 
end of mission activities.
Mitigate / 
Closed
(Realized)
• Met with HQ on this issue Friday 
January 27, 2017
• Passivation date moved to March 
30, 2017
• Mission requires ~$217K 
additional budget to complete 
Phase F based on new 
passivation date.
Staffing (end of ops 
contract) (1×1)
Expected Closure:
03/30/17
E If the existing staff is not available for executing the 
passivation due to a contract changeover
Then Passivation will have to be performed by 
operators who are unfamiliar with peculiarities of 
EO-1 and may not be successful in accomplishing 
passivation
Mitigate • Worked with contract team to 
ensure that we retain a contract 
vehicle to maintain staff in place 
through end of decommissioning
• Current Contract goes through 
May 2017 due to protest of follow-
on contract.
o If protest is upheld, will remain 
with current contract
o If protest is withdrawn or 
overturned, can either remain 
with current contract or transition 
to new contract since same 
company will provide service
Schedule Risk
(2×1)
Expected Closure:
03/30/17
F If key milestones are not achieved
Then passivation date may slip
Mitigate / 
Accept
• Closed all 18 Decommissioning 
Review RFA’s by February 23, 2017
• KDP-F scheduled for March 10, 2017 
• Awaiting HQ approval for early 
passivation required before March 22, 
2017
Decommissioning Risks (cont’d)
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G
G
Rank ID Risk Statement Approach Status
Record 
Management 
Archive (5×1)
Expected Closure:
08/17/17
G If unable to establish National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA) agreement on electronic file 
archives as encountered with TRMM Archives
Then final archive may be delayed beyond EO-1 
closeout
Mitigate • Working with GSFC Center Records 
Manager, the GSFC Archivist, and the 
GSFC FPD Records Manager, 
seeking language clarification 
requirements and a path to records 
acceptance by NARA.
• Allocated additional staff while 
personnel are available.
• Plan to allocated additional funds to 
assist ESMO beyond EO-1 Closeout  
if archive is not complete
Decommissioning Risks (cont’d)
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G
ESMO Project Issue Summary
Records Management – Archive Issues
Status as of 1/31/2017
Problem/Issue Impact/Concern Action Status
Y
National Archives and 
Records Administration 
(NARA) has rejected 
multiple submissions of 
the TRMM electronic 
archives based on the 
requirement for specific 
meta data for each file on 
each type of media (CDs 
and hard drives).
TRMM hardcopy records 
have already been 
accepted by NARA.   
The 17 years of TRMM electronic 
records will not go into archives as 
part of the final decommissioning 
step of the mission.
Completion of EO-1 
decommissioning in Spring of 2017 
could be significantly delayed due 
to issues with archiving electronic 
records.    
1. Work with the GSFC 
Center Records Manager 
to negotiate the NARA 
requirements for 
electronic records.
2. Disposition the 6 
remaining boxes of TRMM 
electronic media records 
3. Ensure that EO-1 records 
can be expeditiously 
archived during 
decommissioning.
1. Waiting for feedback from the 
Center Records Manager on the 
required input to the NARA 
submission forms.  ESMO is drafting 
recommendations for consideration 
in future NPR / GPR versions.
2. ESMO investigating the effort 
required to prepare the meta data 
for the thousands of files in the 
electronic archives
3. ESMO is compiling the EO-1 archives 
list and assessing the impact of 
meeting the NARA requirements.
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Other Lessons Learned
• More effort and coordination that originally anticipated, especially due to the 
fact that there was no good way to disable the power
• We had no good way to do spacecraft simulations because that was not part 
of the original design of the mission. 
o Original design did not take into account turning off the satellite or how it would be done.
o Lack of high fidelity simulator
o Original budget did not take into account all of the system engineering, testing and 
rehearsals
• Added end of mission engineering tests which also was not part of the 
original budget  (did streamline operations and made it work)
24
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Decommission Documentation
Phase F Documentation Products (7120.5E)
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Table I-4:  Project Milestone Products Maturity Matrix
Table I-5: Project Plan Control Plans Maturity Matrix
Reqt Source, 7120.5, 
Appendix I Reqt Owner Where
Mishap Preparedness & Contingency 
Plan
I-4, HQ Products, #6 OSMA
End of Mission Plan
I-4, Project Technical 
Products, #14
OSMA Complete EOMP
Baseline Phase F Work Plan
I-4, Project Mgt, 
Planning & Control, #3
OCE Complete Project Phase F Plan
Documentation of Performance 
against last approved baseline 
I-4, Project Mgt, 
Planning & Control, #4
OCE Complete Presentation
Phase F Risk Assessment 
I-4, Project Mgt, 
Planning & Control, #5a
OCE Complete Project Phase F Plan
Phase F Cost Estimate
I-4, Project Mgt, 
Planning & Control, #5e
OCE Complete Project Phase F Plan
Basis of Estimate for Phase F cost & 
schedule
I-4, Project Mgt, 
Planning & Control, #5f
OCE Complete Project Phase F Plan
CADRe
I-4, Project Mgt, 
Planning & Control, #5i
CAD
Decommissioning Plan
I-4, Project Mgt, 
Planning & Control, #6
OCE Complete Project Phase F Plan
Safety & Mission Assurance Plan I-5, #2 OSMA
Security Plan I-5, #17 OPS
Updated 
annually
ESMO System Security 
Plan
Project Protection Plan I-5, #18 OCE N/A
Communications Plan OComm Complete Presentation
Termination Notification Letter NPR 8010 SMD Complete
ESD Correspondence 
Files
not required for extended 
missions
not required for extended 
missions
In Work to include Phase F costs
End of Mission Plan (EOMP)
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Document
Revision
Approval Date Description
Baseline January 2008 Initial Release, Incomplete approvals
Revision 1 July 2012 Updated to reflect NASA-STD 8719.14A 
requirements, current spacecraft status, 
and full approvals
Revision 2 
(Final)
October 2016 Final version to reflect current 
spacecraft and orbit status and EOM 
plan implementation.  Includes updated 
decommissioning requirements gleaned 
from the Phase F report dated 17 June 
2016.  Also Includes added detail about 
the passivation sequence.  Over 50% of 
text was changed since the June 2012 
version, so a whole new version of the 
document is being submitted instead of 
redlines.
EOMP Addendum Memo
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Document
Revision
Approval Date Description
Fuel Purge 
Addendum
March 2017 Table 2-2 item on Propulsion System 
amended as described below.
Section 4.2 on Accidental Explosions 
amended as described below.
Section 6.6 Passivation, list item 6 
amended as described below
Logic: Agreement was reached with Orbital Debris Program 
Office (ODPO) and Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
(OSMA) that when EO-1 could not complete a 100 second burn 
without an autonomous Attitude Control Subsystem (ACS) abort 
due to “sputtering” of the thrusters, that would demonstrate 
sufficient exhaustion of the fuel tank. Experts agree that EO-1 
is essentially out of fuel since the subsequent maneuver 
performed on February 2, 2017 terminated after only 60 seconds 
because there was insufficient fuel to maintain attitude 
control. Any attempts to further deplete the fuel will result in 
entering Safe Hold as there is insufficient fuel to control the 
spacecraft.
Also, after submitting the EOMP to Configuration Management, 
it was determined that the EO-1 propulsion design prohibits 
leaving thruster valves open for extended durations. Leaving 
thruster valves open indefinitely is not possible without 
significant effort to obviate the onboard design.
Decommissioning Documentation 
• Orbital Debris Assessment Report performed in 1999 (copy 
included in the EOMP)
– An uncontrolled reentry is predicted to occur in approximately 2056
– The EOMP states that the calculated spacecraft Debris Casualty Area 
(DCA) is 4.04 m2, which adjusted for the expected population density 
for its orbit at the time of reentry, produces a probability of human 
casualty from reentering debris of about 1 in 19,400, which is 
compliant with requirement 4.7-1 (1:10,000). 
– It should be noted that only 69% of the spacecraft mass was included 
in the original DAS assessment that had been completed prior to 
launch and information on the components that had been omitted 
from the original DAS assessment is not available to do a complete 
assessment now
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